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M ost of the existing written legal rules for the conduct of armed conflict at sea were adopted before the development of oil propulsion for 
warships, radar, electric torpedoes, naval aircraft, aircraft carriers, nuclear-
propulsion submarines and many other modern naval platforms and systems. 
These systems and weapons have been in naval inventories for decades. A 
comprehensive discussion of how these elements of modern technology 
interact with the law of armed conflict at sea would necessarily involve an 
analysis of each of these developments and its impact on the relevant norms 
of the law of armed conflict. It is not the purpose of this chapter, however, 
to examine each of these in detail. The weapons systems and naval platforms 
that found their way into naval inventories prior to and during World War 
II have found an uneasy peace with the traditional rules. It is rather the purpose 
of this chapter to review the norms for the conduct of armed conflict at sea 
as they may affect and be affected by technological development, and to 
examine briefly how current norms may impact on some of the more exotic 
systems that have become a part of naval inventories within recent decades 
or are under development and likely to become part of them in the near future. 
The occasion for this review is the recent publication of The Commander's 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9),1 the u.s. Navy's official 
manual on operational law, including the law of naval warfare. As such, the 
Handbook represents the official position of the United States with respect 
to the legality of the deployment and employment of weapons in armed 
conflicts at sea. The principal provisions of the Handbook relevant to this issue 
are found in Chapter 8, "The Law of Naval Targeting," Chapter 9, 
"Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems," Chapter 10, "Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Weapons," and Chapter 11, "Noncombatant 
Persons." Several aspects of these subjects are addressed in detail in other 
chapters of this book-naval targeting in Chapter IX by Sally V. and W. 
Thomas Mallison, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by Howard S. 
Levie in Chapter XI, and noncombatant persons by Frits Kalshoven in Chapter 
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X. Jon L. Jacobson addresses the particular problem of submarine compliance 
with the law of armed conflict in Chapter VIII, and Thomas Clingan addresses 
mine warfare in Chapter XII. It is not the purpose of this chapter to repeat 
what is said in those chapters but rather to attempt to synthesize the impact 
that internationally accepted rules have on the acquisition, retention, or 
employment of weapons using exotic or innovative technology. In order to 
do so I shall first determine the content of the applicable rules. I shall" then 
proceed to analyze specific weapons and weapons systems in light of these 
rules. 
History and Content of the Rules 
The basic norm of the humanitarian law of armed conflict is that the right 
of parties to adopt means and methods of warfare is not unlimited. This norm 
is included in several international instruments2 and, additionally, has been 
generally recognized as having attained binding force as customary 
internationallaw.3 
Flowing from this basic norm are a number of more specific rules setting 
forth the limits which are generally applicable to the means and methods of 
armed conflict. Like the basic norm, they are a part of customary international 
law and in most cases have also been included in one or more international 
instruments. Although stated somewhat differently from instrument to 
instrument, they include the following principles: 
- The distinction between combatants and non-combatants must be recognized.4 
- Non-combatants may not be made the object of direct attack.s 
- The methods or means of attack of a combatant (or legitimate military target) may 
not have indiscriminate effect.6 
- As a necessary corollary to the preceding principle, weapons which by their nature 
are incapable of being directed specifically against military targets and therefore put 
combatants and non-combatants at equal risk are forbidden because of their 
indiscriminate effect.7 
- Even where an attack is directed specifically at a legitimate military target, if the 
incidental effect on non-combatants is disproportional to the value of the military target, 
then the attack may not be made.8 
- The methods and means of attack may not be such as to cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering.9 
- A combatant may not kill or wound an enemy who has surrendered, laid down 
his arms or no longer has a means of defense.lo 
- The methods and means may not include treachery or perfidy.!l 
Some would include in this list the employment "of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment. "12 This principle made 
its first appearance in humanitarian law in Additional Protocol I in 1977, and 
can hardly be said at this time to repres~nt cust01llary international law. The 
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Government of the United States does not recognize this prohibition as part 
of customary internationallaw.13 
Section 8.1 of Chapter 8 of the Handbook states these general principles in 
slightly different terms, as follows: 
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. 
2. It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such. 
3. Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to the effect 
that noncombatants be spared as much as possible.l4 
The Handbook then admonishes: 
These legal principles governing targeting generally parallel the military principles of 
object, mass, and economy of force. The law requires that only objectives of military 
importance be attacked but permits the use of sufficient mass to destroy those objectives. 
At the same time, unnecessary (and wasteful) collateral destruction must be avoided 
to the extent possible and, consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of 
the force, unnecessary human suffering prevented. The law of naval targeting, therefore, 
requires that all reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that only military 
objectives are targeted so that civilians and civilian objects are spared as much as possible 
the ravages of war.l5 
During the period of the last century and a quarter there has been a series 
of attempts in the international arena to translate these general norms into 
specific prohibitions against the development or employment of particular 
weapon systems that advancing technology has brought into the armaments 
of the armed forces of many nations. These efforts have met with only limited 
success. 
The first attempt was in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868,16 which 
contained a prohibition on the use, in time of war, of any projectile of less 
than 400 grams which "is either explosive or charged with fulminating or 
inflammable substances. "17 In other words, only artillery shells, not small 
caliber bullets, which presumably would only be directed against humans, 
may contain an explosive or incendiary charge. The possibility of future 
prohibitions was contemplated. IS 
This initiative was followed up in 1899 at the Hague by three Declarations, 
the first prohibiting the use of bullets that expand or flatten on piercing the 
human body ("dum-dum" bullets}.19 The second prohibited the discharge of 
projectiles and explosives from balloons.20 The third prohibited projectiles 
the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.21 
The first of these implemented the general norm against weapons that caused 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The second implemented the 
general principle against weapons having an indiscriminate effect, and the 
third was under the umbrella of both of these general principles. 
The Hague Conference of1907 dealt explicitly with several aspects of naval 
warfare. The conventions adopted at the conference included one governing 
the conduct of naval bombardment.22 A second, dealing with contact mines,23 
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required, inter alia, that unanchored contact mines should automatically disarm 
themselves within one hour of the time the person launching the mine ceases 
to control them and that anchored contact mines should become harmless 
when they have broken loose from their moorings.24 Included within the 
contact-mine Convention was a requirement that torpedoes should be 
rendered harmless when they have missed their target.25 These restrictions 
were acceptable to the conferees because they were obviously in the interest 
of the powers that had the technology to develop such weapons since free-
floating mines and torpedoes were just as much a hazard to friendly forces 
as enemy. Also the technology to implement these prohibitions was in hand. 
The technologically advanced nations were, however, unwilling to 
renounce the benefits of technology which might be of benefit to them. As 
stated by Antonio Cassese, "Whenever it has turned out that a means of 
destruction was really effective, states have refrained from outlawing it."26 
He echoes a statement by the United States representative at the 1899 Peace 
Conference, who said: 
The general spirit of the proposals that have received the favorable support of the 
subcommission is a spirit of tolerance with regard to methods tending to increase the 
efficacy of means of making war and a spirit of restriction with regard to methods which, 
without being necessary from the standpoint of efficiency, have seemed needlessly 
cruel. ... 
[I]t is the efficacy that we have wished to safeguard, even at the risk of increasing 
suffering, were that indispensable.27 
This remains the prevailing attitude among technologically advanced states 
and has been reflected in their negotiating positions in more recent 
conferences. 
In the period between World Wars I and II, diplomatic attempts to prohibit 
or restrict specific weapons were limited to two weapons or methods of 
warfare-poison gas and the submarine28-not surprisingly means and 
methods of warfare employed first and most effectively by the defeated 
powers. The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare29 
prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and extends that 
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The Protocol 
has received wide acceptance, currently being in effect for 135 states.30 
The force of these prohibitions is somewhat weakened by the large number 
of reservations which declare that the Protocol shall cease to be binding on 
the reserving state as to enemy states whose armed forces or allies fail to 
respect the prohibition.31 The United States is among those reserving.32 In 
light of the combined effect of the large number of parties and the large 
number of reservations, it is generally accepted that this Protocol bars only 
the "first use" of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons.33 
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The efforts to deal with the legality of employment of submarines in naval 
warfare are the subject of a separate chapter in this volume and will not be 
dealt with in this essay.34 
The post-World War II efforts to put limitations on the use of certain 
weapons have to a large extent been conducted within the context of 
disarmament, which is beyond the scope of this essay, but one of them resulted 
in a convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons. That is the 1972 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction.35 Drafted by the Committee on Disarmament, this convention, 
going beyond the prohibitions of use included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
obligates each State Party: 
[N]ever in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain: 
1. microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origins or method of 
production of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; 
2. weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for 
hostile purposes or i~ armed conflict.36 
Parties are also required to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes any stocks 
they may already have and may not transfer such agents to any recipient or 
"assist, encourage, or induce any state, group of states, or international 
organization" to manufacture or acquire them.37 
The Committee on Disarmament's initial approach was to include chemical 
weapons in the prohibition, but this proved impossible.38 
The Convention entered into force in 1975 and has been rapidly and widely 
accepted. As of January 1, 1989, it had 110 parties.39 
The most significant recent demonstration of the reluctance of states to 
commit to specific bans was in the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, convened under the sponsorship of the 
Government of Switzerland, which met in annual sessions from 1974 through 
1977. At that conference, although one of the standing committees was 
charged with examining proposals for restrictions on specific weapons, and 
the ICRC attempted to assist the process by convening conferences of experts 
in 1974 and 1976, no specific bans emerged. Subsequently, a United States 
spokesman stated: 
[T]here was a considerable measure of agreement on a detailed set of regulations to 
govern the recording of [land] minefields, the use of [land] mines in populated areas, 
and the prohibition of certain types of especially inhumane booby trap devices. 
Useful work was also done on the subject of napalm and other incendiary weapons. 
However, it was clear at the end of the conference that large gaps still remained between 
those who wanted to prohibit incendiaries generally, and those (including the major 
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Western military powers) who were prepared to accept substantial restrictions on the 
use of flame weapons in populated areas but were not prepared to give up battlefield 
uses of the weapons.411 
The conference did, however, take two actions that might be considered 
useful with respect to specific bans. The first was the adoption of an article 
of additional Protocol I mandating a system of national legal reviews of new 
weapons systems before they are produced or acquired.41 The second was the 
adoption of a resolution calling on the United Nations to convene a follow-
up conference on the prohibition or restriction of certain conventional 
weapons by 1979.42 
The requirement for the system of national legal review is found in article 
36 of Additional Protocol I, which provides: 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method 
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or any 
other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. 
Several important points should be noted about article 36. First, the article 
1· nl "" I h I I " " app les 0 y to new weapons. t may, owever, a so app y to a new use 
(method) of an old system. Second, the state party's determination that a new 
weapon, means or method of warfare is prohibited would not mean that the 
state is prohibited from acquiring or possessing the weapon. A nation may, 
for example, stockpile weapons it determines to be prohibited for use as an 
instrument of reprisal (provided, of course, that weapon is not absolutely 
prohibited by some absolute rule against acquisition or retention (e.g., 
biological weapons)). Third, the state is to examine whether a weapon would 
be prohibited either because it is inherently unlawful in any form of 
employment (e.g., indiscriminate effect) or only in "some" circumstances. The 
conferees recognized that any weapon could be misused in a way that is illegal. 
The purpose of the national evaluation is to analyze the weapon in terms of 
its "normal or expected use. "43 Fourth, the applicable sta~dards for review 
are the terms of Additional Protocol I itself (primarily article 35) or "any 
other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party." 
This presumably includes the customary rules of the law of armed conflict 
as well as treaties. And finally, the determination oflegality vel non is a national 
determination. It does not establish a standard that must be applied by other 
states; there is no requirement that it be published.44 
Article 36 might be regarded as a bridge between the general prescriptive 
norms established by Article 35 and the enforcement of prohibitions or 
restrictions on specific weapons or methods of warfare. Some states wished 
to establish an international body with authority to monitor and draw up lists 
of weapons or methods of use that fell within the proscription of article 35.45 
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Other states felt that this would put the Conference into the field of 
disarmament, a subject beyond its competence.46 
The article as adopted is a compromise between these two points of view. 
It was an international application of procedures already in place in several 
states, and for that reason it could command wide support from Western 
military powers. Under Department of Defense Instruction 5500.15 the 
United States, for example, had established a program in 1974 that stated a 
policy that: 
All actions of the Department of Defense with respect to the acquisition and 
procurement of weapons, and their intended use in armed conflict, shall be consistent 
with the obligations assumed by the United States Government under all applicable 
treaties, with customary intemationallaw, and, in particular, with the laws of war.47 
The Instruction placed responsibility on each Military Department to 
ensure that the Judge Advocate General of the Department would review 
all weapons intended to meet a military requirement to determine whether 
they were consistent with the above-quoted criteria. This review was to be 
conducted "prior to the award of an initial contract for production" and "at 
such subsequent stages in acquisition or procurement as the Judge Advocate 
General concerned determines it is appropriate."48 The Judge Advocates 
General are required to maintain permanent ftles of opinions issued by them.49 
Each of the military departments has implemented this Instruction by internal 
regulations detailing how and when these reviews shall be conducted.50 
As to the second outcome of the 1977 Conference dealing with specific 
bans (the Resolution calling for the United Nations to convene a follow-up 
conference), the United Nations responded by convening two sessions of a 
Preparatory Conference in 1978 and 1979 and a United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, which met in 1979 and 1980. The latter produced a 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.51 The operative portions of the convention 
are contained in three Protocols, the first prohibiting use "of any weapon 
the primary effect of which is to injure by any fragments which in the human 
body can escape detection by x-rays. "52 The second contains prohibitions and 
restrictions on the use of land mines, booby traps and other devices.53 The 
third deals with incendiary weapons.54 It does not prohibit the use of 
incendiary weapons such as napalm against military objectives, but it prohibits 
making "the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects 
the object of attack by incendiary weapons. "55 It also prohibits making a 
military objective within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by 
air-delivered incendiary weapons; and prohibits such attacks by non-air-
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delivered weapons except when the objective is clearly separated from the 
non-military objects and "all feasible precautions" are taken to limit the 
incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects.56 
The Conference, although unable to agree on a protocol on the subject 
of small calibre weapons, adopted a resolution calling for further research 
on the wounding effects of small calibre weapon systems and urging 
governments "to exercise the utmost care in the development of small-calibre 
weapons systems, so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation of the injurious 
effects of such systems. "57 
The Convention entered into force in 1983, but the United States has not 
become a party to it. In a statement made at signature, the United States 
made a Declaration which included the following statement: 
As indicated in the negotiating record of the 1980 Conference, the prohibitions and 
restrictions contained in the Convention and its protocols are of course new contractual 
rules (with the exception of certain provisions which restate existing intemationallaw) 
which will only bind States upon their ratification of, or accession to, the Convention 
and their consent to be bound by the Protocols in question.58 
The second Protocol, dealing only with methods ofland warfare, is beyond 
the scope of this essay. The first Protocol, of course, is a specific ban of a 
particular weapon, and, if applicable, would bar employment of such a 
weapon by a combatant. It is interesting to note that despite the U.S. 
declaration that the prohibitions and restrictions of the Protocols are 
contractual and bind states only upon their becoming parties to them, the 
Handbook takes the position that "using materials that are difficult to detect 
or are undetectable by field x-ray equipment, such as glass or clear plastic, 
as the injuring mechanism in military ammunition is prohibited, since they 
unnecessarily inhibit the treatment of wounds. "59 The Annotation60 does not 
cite the 1980 Protocol I as authority for this proposition, and since it is included 
in a paragraph entitled "Unnecessary Suffering," it must be presumed that 
the authors of the Commander's Handbook considered the use of such materials 
as contrary to the general principle against inflicting unnecessary suffering. 
Some commentators have been critical that the conferences held in the 
decade of the 70's did not make more progress in establishing prohibitions 
on specific weapons, means or methods of warfare. Antonio Cassese, for 
example, has said that confining the prohibitions to general principles has 
two major disadvantages: first, "they are couched in very vague terms" and 
second, "[ t ]heir application is left to the belligerents concerned. "61 As a result, 
he says, a belligerent who believes his enemy is using an illegal means, can 
only resort to reprisals or a threat of prosecution of those responsible as war 
criminals.62 Echoing the comments at and after the Hague Conferences, he 
concludes that the ultimate question then comes down to one of power. He 
says: 
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[W]hether this kind of reaction can produce any real effect actually depends on how 
strong the belligerent resorting to it is. Ultimately, therefore, the implementation of 
the general principles on weapons turns on the military strength of the belligerent; strong 
States can dodge the bans without fear. The only "sanction" against them is to resort 
to world public opinion.63 
But Cassese also recognizes the inadequacies of specific bans. The principal 
one he points out is that prohibitions always lag behind new weapon 
development. Thus, a technologically advanced nation can always develop 
a new weapon, perhaps equally or more cruel, to replace one that is 
specifically banned.64 "As a result," he says, "the gap between technologically 
developed States and less advanced countries could be widened .... "65 
What can we then conclude from this review of authority as to the 
limitations that will apply to a state, particularly a technologically advanced 
state such as the United States, when it makes a decision as to the acquisition 
or employment 'of a naval weapon that its technology is capable of producing 
or in evaluating the legality of one produced or used by an adversary? 
Of the general principles listed earlier, it is to be noted that most of them 
apply to the manner of employment of weapons-that is, targeting, which 
is dealt with in another chapter of this book.66 Only three would prohibit 
use of the weapon itself, irrespective of how it is used. These three are: 
- a weapon may not have indiscriminate effect;67 
- a weapon may not be such as to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;68 
and 
- a weapon may not be one that could only be used in a treacherous or perfidious 
mode.69 
Specific bans are applicable in a few cases: 
- unanchored automatic contact mines must be designed so as to be rendered harmless 
one hour after they are no longer under control;70 
- anchored contact mines must be designed so as to become harmless when they break 
away from their moorings;71 
- torpedoes must be designed to become harmless when they have missed their mark;72 
- a state may not resort to "first use" of poisonous gas;73 
- bacteriological weapons, or their means of delivery, cannot be developed, produced, 
stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained.74 
- a state may not use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments 
which in the human body can escape detection by x-rays.75 
Having reviewed both the general and specific limitations that may apply 
when new technology is converted into weapons, we can now proceed to 
analyze the effect these limitations may have on the acquisition, retention 
or employment of specific weapons systems that have recently come into 
national armament stocks or that are under development. In conducting this 
analysis, I shall single out a few weapon systems that have, in the minds of 
some, raised questions of their legality without attempting to be 
comprehensive. In addition, I shall use as primary exemplars American 
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systems. I shall also, where appropriate, see how these weapons are treated 
in the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9) and express 
at least a tentative opinion as to whether NWP 9's position on the issue is 
justified. As a predicate for the latter task, I might reiterate what I stated 
in the Preface to this volume.76 
NWP 9 is what it states itself to be-a "commander's" handbook, meant 
for the guidance of operational commanders and their staffs to assist them 
to conform their operations-peacetime as well as wartime-to the dictates 
of international law. It is therefore written in terms understandable to the 
lay person. Some might say it paints the picture too much in black and white, 
not recognizing the delicate shadings that reflect the actual state of the law 
that are so dear to the hearts of international-law scholars. It contains no 
footnotes for the benefit of scholars who may wish to know the source of 
the "rule" stated: But, as pointed out in its Preface, it is not a "substitute 
for the definitive legal guidance provided by judge advocates and others 
responsible for advising commanders on the law.''77 
For the benefit of these "judge advocates and others" who will provide 
fuller guidance, there is an encyclopedic "Annotated Supplement''7~ to NWP 
9, prepared under the auspices of the Naval War College and the Judge 
Advocate General of the Navy for distribution to judge advocates having 
responsibility for advice to operational commanders. The Annotated Supplement 
gives a section-by-section analysis of NWP 9 with full discussion of the 
concepts involved and the sources of the rules stated. It will be an invaluable 
resource to persons who will provide advice to commanders at all levels of 
command as well as to scholars engaged in research. 
Specific Weapons Systems79 
Over-the-Horizon Weapons Systems. One of the most significant weapon-
system developments in the post-W orId War II era is the over-the-horizon 
projectile. There are many variations of such systems which are now 
operational or in development in the United States and other navies. 
Typically, in the marine environment, such weapon systems consist of a 
turbofan- or turbojet-propelled cruise missile armed with either a nuclear 
or high-explosive warhead and the associated shipboard or aircraft 
installations for launching and initial guidance. The missile may be launched 
from aircraft, or when equipped with a rocket booster motor, from surface 
ships and submarines. It may follow a preprogrammed cruise flight path or 
may be controlled during flight from the launching platform or pre-positioned 
guidance vessel or aircraft. Its terminal guidance may be heat-seeking, active 
radar homing, television monitoring, or some other system. 
The two most prominent guided-missile systems currently in the United 
States Navy's inventory are the Tomahawk Sea-Launched Cruise Missile and 
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the Harpoon Surface-to-Surface Missile. The former of these is a long-range 
(over 450 kilometer) turbofan-propelled cruise missile designed for submarine 
or surface ship launching against ships or land targets. The latter is a shorter 
range (over 90 kilometer) turbojet-propelled cruise missile designed primarily 
for attacks on surface ships. For land-target attacks the Tomahawk uses an 
inertial guidance system with advanced terrain contour matching (TERCOM) 
for course corrections and target acquisition. For attacks on ships, both the 
Tomahawk and Harpoon use inertial guidance to the vicinity of the target 
where active radar is switched on to detect and lock on the target. 
In his 1972 article, "The Legality of Cruise Missiles,"80 D. P. 0 'Connell 
observed that: 
[T]he specific questions that should be posed [as to the legality of naval cruise missiles] 
are whether the existing rules of international law respecting discrimination between 
military and civilian targets can be observed in practice ... , and whether the immunity 
of neutral shipping from attack can be respected.81 
The questions remain the same today. The questions suggest, and correctly 
so, that the weapon itself is not per se illegal, but rather that the legality of 
its use depends on the particular circumstances prevailing at the time of the 
intended employment. Where the conflict is being conducted in an area where 
there is small likelihood that anything but legitimate targets will be present, 
the use of long-range surface-to-surface or air-to-surface missiles would be 
entirely legitimate. But as the recent experience in the Persian-Arabian Gulf 
war between Iran and Iraq has shown, the risk of error in identification of 
targets is high when the naval conflict takes place in an area in which neutral 
warships and shipping are intermingled in close proximity with the naval 
forces and merchant shipping of the contending powers. In all long-range 
systems of which I am aware, the initial guidance system only takes the missile 
to the general vicinity of the target, at which point the terminal guidance 
system takes over, picks out the target and self-guides the missile to it, usually 
through an infrared homing device or active radar acquisition and tracking. 
In either event, the missile's ability to discriminate between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets that may be in the area is limited. The legality of using 
such long-range weapons would depend on a balancing of the risk of harm 
to non-legitimate targets with the importance of the legitimate target to the 
accomplishment of the military mission.82 
The Commander's Handbook recognizes these limitations. With respect 
to over-the-horizon weapons, it provides: 
Missiles and projectiles dependent upon over-the-horizon or beyond-visual-range 
guidance systems are lawful, provided they are equipped with sensors, or are employed 
in conjunction with external sources of targeting data, that are sufficient to ensure 
effective target discrimination.83 
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CAPTOR Mine. Although mine warfare is the subject of a separate chapter 
herein,84 it is appropriate to consider the CAPTOR mine briefly in this chapter 
as well, since it is a technologically sophisticated weapon system which has 
made its appearance in the last decade or so. 
CAPTOR is an American antisubmarine weapon consisting of an 
encapsulated Mark 46 torpedo, which is anchored to the ocean floor in the 
same manner as a naval mine, and can be laid by either submarines or aircraft. 
When its acoustic detection system determines that an enemy submarine is 
within range, it launches the torpedo, which homes on the target. 
CAPTOR thus has some of the characteristics of a mine and some of a 
torpedo. It would thus be subject to any specific restrictions applicable to 
torpedoes or mines, as well as any more general restrictions. 
As we have seen, the only specific limitation on mines and torpedoes are 
those contained in Hague VIII.8s Since, however, Hague VIII deals only with 
"automatic contact mines," its specific prohibitions and restrictions are 
inapplicable to CAPTOR. Its provision with respect to torpedoes is limited 
to a prohibition against use of "torpedoes which do not become harmless when 
they have missed their mark."86 This latter provision poses no problem to 
the legality of CAPTOR, since all United States-designed torpedoes are 
designed to sink to the bottom and become harmless when they have 
completed their propulsion run.87 
With respect to the general prohibitions, the only one that could possibly 
be applicable is that prohibiting a weapon which may have indiscriminate 
effect. Although once laid, the CAPTOR mine is not within the control of 
the party that has planted it, its design incorporates features that prevent it 
from having indiscriminate effect. Its sensors permit it to recognize the 
"signatures" of enemy submarines, thus preventing it from being activated 
by an unintended target vessel. Once launched, the torpedo itself is "gated" 
to prevent it from straying outside pre-set depth parameters and becoming 
a danger to surface shipping that may be in the area. CAPTOR thus does 
not appear to fall within the prohibition against weapons having 
indiscriminate effect. 
Although the Commander's Handbook does not single out CAPTOR for 
specific comment in its sections on naval mines88 and torpedoes,89 its discussion 
of the limitations and prohibitions on the employment of mines appears to 
comply with the prohibitions discussed. The Handbook acknowledges that 
"[ t ]echnological developments have created weapons systems obviously not 
contemplated by the drafters of [the 1907 Hague] rules."90 It then adds, 
"Nonetheless, the general principles of law embodied in the 1907 Hague 
Convention continue to serve as a guide to lawful employment of naval 
mines."91 
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Directed Energy Devices. Of all the weapons systems brought forth by modern 
technology, the most exotic are those using directed energy devices. While 
evoking images of "Buck Rogers in the 25th Century" and "Star Wars," the 
fact is that some of these devices are already incorporated into a number of 
current weapon systems, primarily for such functions as range-finding, target-
designating or target-illuminating. But the energy stream they emit may also 
directly disable enemy materiel or injure or kill enemy personnel. Because 
they are particularly effective in space, where their energy is not scattered 
or attenuated by the atmosphere or pollutants, they will comprise essential 
components of the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative. The United 
States Department of Defense has reported that the Soviet Union is 
developing high-energy lasers for strategic air defense, space-based anti-
satellite missions, and possibly for anti-ballistic-missile defense.92 
"Directed energy" is a generic term embracing three technologies: lasers, 
high-powered microwave devices, and particle beams. All have in common 
the production and emission of a stream or beam of concentrated electro-
magnetic energy or atomic or sub-atomic particles. 
Lasers emit a focused, very narrow beam of energy. In their low-energy 
versions, they may be used for range-finding, target-designating or target 
illuminating for a variety of weapon systems or to dazzle or distract an 
approaching watercraft or aircraft by creating a flash oflight when the beam 
strikes the windscreen of the craft. The effect is much like that of attempting 
to drive an automobile directly into a rising or setting sun. Even a low-energy 
laser can cause retinal damage and temporary or permanent visual impairment 
to a person who is looking directly at the emitter, since the eye focuses the 
beam on a small spot on the retina. The harm is aggravated and the range 
of harm is extended if the person is using binoculars. In their high-energy 
versions, lasers can physically damage enemy materiel by the rapid buildup 
of intense heat on the target. They can jam or cause permanent damage to 
optical, electro-optical, or infrared systems. 
Microwave devices propagate much like light beams but are absorbed and 
reflected differently. They can pass through glass, plastic and fabric with little 
or no energy loss and can guide on metallic objects such as wires. These devices 
can jam or cause permanent damage to materiel components either by 
disrupting electric or electromagnetic circuits or causing physical damage by 
rapid heat buildup. 
Particle beam devices differ from lasers and microwave devices in that they 
actually transmit matter rather than energy. The absorption of the matter 
by the target creates intense heating, which can cause meltdown or 
destruction of components. Impact with the target may also create secondary 
emissions of gamma and x-rays. These devices do not appear to have much 
capability for current tactical application because they require an extremely 
high power accelerator and power source, which cannot be made 
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transportable. They will probably find application in anti-ballistic-missile and 
anti-satellite systems, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Most of the discussion on the legality of directed energy devices has 
centered on lasers. At the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian 
Law, several nations attempted to bring the matter forward, but were 
unsuccessful. Again, at the follow-on U.N. Conference on Certain 
Conventional Weapons in Geneva in 1978, the subject was raised but not dealt 
with. At the xxv International Conference of the Red Cross in 1986, Sweden 
and Switzerland offered a resolution condemning the blinding effect of laser 
weapons, but it did not gain much support and was not adopted by the 
Conference. The most recent attempt of Sweden to raise the issue is 
summarized by the Judge Advocate General of the Army as follows: 
In April 1988 Sweden again endeavored to raise the issue, though in substantially 
modified form. It acknowledged the legality of the use oflasers to produce flash effects 
to combatants; accepted the lawfulness of the use of lasers for rangefinding, target 
acquisition, and similar military purposes; and also accepted the legality of blinding of 
enemy combatants incidental to the use of a laser for the above-cited purposes. Sweden's 
most recent effort proposed to prohibit use of lasers as antipersonnel weapons per se. 
This proposal, offered first on an informal basis to delegates to the United Nations 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 18 April 1988, and subsequently to the United 
Nations Special Session on Disarmament III in New York in June, 1988, ~et with no 
success in either instance.93 
Pursuant to Department of Defense Instruction 5500.15,94 the Judge 
Advocate General GAG) of the Army reviewed the legality of the use oflasers 
as antipersonnel weapons. In a memorandum o flaw , concurred in by the Judge 
Advocates General of the other military departments,95 the JAG concluded 
that "the use oflasers as antipersonnel weapons would not cause unnecessary 
suffering nor otherwise constitute a violation of the international legal 
obligations of the United States. Accordingly, the use of a laser as an 
antipersonnel weapon is lawful." The rationale for the conclusion was that 
blinding was "no stranger to the battlefield," since it already occurred from 
multiple causes; "potential laser injuries can be minimized with the utilization 
of appropriate protective equipment and defensive actions;" although lasers 
may cause permanent blindness, many injuries caused by admittedly lawful 
weapons also result in permanent disabling effects; the prohibition against 
employment of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering" (Hague IV, art. 23 (e)) must be balanced against "the necessity 
for destructive power adequate to meet a variety of thr.eats at a variety of 
ranges and in a variety of circumstances;" and finally, that prohibiting direct 
laser attacks on enemy combatant personnel would lead to the anomaly "that 
a soldier legally could be blinded ancillary to the lawful use of a laser 
range finder or target acquisition lasers but could not be attacked 
individually. "96 
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Lasers and other directed energy devices must be examined for their legality 
on the basis of the same criteria we have used in looking at the other weapons 
systems discussed earlier.97 Of those criteria, only two appear to have possible 
applicability. These are that a weapon may not have indiscriminate effect, 
and a weapon may not be such as to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. 
As to the first of these-indiscriminate effect-it would appear that 
directed energy devices have a higher order of discrimination than almost 
any other weapon, current or projected, in military arsenals. The streams 
of energy are highly focused and narrow; they travel at or near the speed 
of light and thus "hit" the target essentially at the same time they are 
launched, eliminating the problem of "leading" the target to obtain a hit; 
and since they travel in a straight line, they are essentially limited to line 
of sight, drastically reducing the danger to objects or persons not being 
targeted. . 
The Army JAG memorandum of law focused on the second criterion-
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The most severe effects on 
personnel produced by lasers are blindness, temporary or permanent, and, 
at high powers, severe skin bums. As to the former of these, the Army 
memorandum states: 
The human eye is particularly susceptible to laser light in the visible and near infrared 
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum because of the focussing properties of the 
human cornea and lens. Laser light incident on the cornea ... is focussed to a very 
small retinal spot increasing the energy per unit area on the retina by a factor of 100,000 
times. At these levels the high concentration oflight is sufficient to produce irreversible 
damage by a mechanism known as photocoagulation. At these high levels of laser 
irradiation the effects on the human eye may be the appearance of a large retinal bum 
with accompanying hemorrhage into the portion of the eye behind the lens. As the 
incident laser energy is reduced, the hemorrhage is no longer a factor and the size of 
the retinal bum diminishes. As the laser exposure level falls below the threshold for 
retinal bum, the effect is one of bright light exposure producing a dazzle or glare 
phenomenon. In general the factors of importance in laser-induced trauma of the eye 
follow those of exposure to any intense light source, including the.sun.98 
The Army memorandum concludes that neither blindness nor permanent 
disablement on the battlefield are unique to laser weapons. The mere fact 
that a particular weapon causes one form of disablement rather than another 
is no justification for concluding that one is legal while the other is not. 
Further, according to the Army memorandum: 
Proposals to conclude that the use of a laser to intentionally blind would result in 
unnecessary suffering would lead to a contradiction in the law in that a soldier legally 
could be blinded ancillary to the lawful use of a laser rangefmder or target acquisition 
lasers against materiel targets, but could not be attacked individually.99 
This final argument seems somewhat specious to me. The principle of 
distinction underlies many of the norms of the humanitarian law of armed 
Robertson 377 
conflict. The most notable, of course, is the prohibition against making direct 
attacks on civilians and civilian objects while permitting injury or damage 
to civilian and civilian objects as an inevitable incident of attacks on legitimate 
military objectives. I see no anomaly in allowing incidental eye damage from 
use of laser range-finding or target acquisition while prohibiting lasers for 
the sole purpose of permanently blinding enemy combatants. It may be 
difficult to police the distinction made, but there is no theoretical basis for 
not making such a distinction. 
The Army JAG memorandum only mentions skin burns in passing, pointing 
out that, "Incendiary weapons have been in use by most nations throughout 
the history of war." The memorandum also rightly points out that attempts 
to enjoin their use against military personnel foundered at the 1978-80 United 
Nations Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons. In this respect, the 
Army memorandum is undoubtedly correct, and there is no reason to believe 
that burns caused by lasers or other directed-energy weapons are any more 
horrible than burns caused by napalm bombs, flame-throwers or other 
incendiary weapons. 
The Commander's Handbook does not specifically address directed energy 
devices or weapons. It does include a paragraph on incendiary weapons, 
stating that they are lawful provided they are employed "in a manner that 
minimizes uncontrolled or indiscriminate effects on the civilian population 
consistent with mission accomplishment and force security. "lOO 
Depleted Uranium Ammunition. Depleted uranium is the metal that remains 
after the fissile, highly radioactive uranium has been removed to make nuclear 
weapons. Its high atomic weight and its extreme hardness make it the ideal 
material for a number of commercial applications, such as machine tool boring 
bars, gyroscope rotors and oil well drill collars as well as counterweights in 
military and commercial aircraft and keel ballast for high performance sailing 
yachts. Its great mass also makes it an ideal material for projectiles intended 
to destroy or disable the target by physical impact. The Navy's Phalanx close-
in weapon system, which is designed for last-ditch defense against attacking 
high speed aircraft or guided missiles, uses a five-barrel Gatling gun firing 
several thousand 20mm depleted uranium projectiles per minute. The U.S. 
Air Force also uses a 30mm version as its main anti-tank weapon for its A-
10 aircraft. 
The question of whether the use of such projectiles breaches any norm of 
the law of armed conflict depends on whether they are "poisoned weapons," 
prohibited by article 23 of the Hague (IV) Regulations for land warfarelol 
and by the customary law of warfare at sea.102 
Depleted uranium can hardly be considered as poison, however. The 
radioactivity it emits is said to be less than one-seventh that of the luminous 
dial of a wristwatch. An Air Force source states that a man could hold a 30mm 
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round of depleted uranium ammunition for four and one-half hours per day 
forever and not exceed the permissible radiation dose. Further, its chemical 
toxicity is less than lead, which is a commonly used component of ballistic 
projectiles. 
Conclusion 
This admittedly selective review of some of the weapons systems brought 
forth under advancing technology has shown that none of the weapons 
reviewed can be said to be unlawful per se, although, like all other weapons 
systems, they can be employed in such a way as to make their use unlawful. 
Furthermore, if current technological trends continue, weapons will become 
more discriminating, although more highly destructive. The Commander's 
Handbook, although not dealing with each of these systems explicitly, sets forth 
principles that are adequate to provide guidance to commanders employing 
such weapons so that they may avoid using them in an unlawful manner. In 
addition, the legal review processes established by the Secretary of Defense 
and implemented by each of the Military Departments provide a mechanism 
for continuing oversight of the development, deployment, and employment 
of new, technologically advanced systems to ensure that the legal restraints 
on their development and use are considered by appropriate officials. 
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